Social Structure and Opinion Formation

We present a dynamical theory of opinion formation that takes explicitly into account the structure of the social network in which in- dividuals are embedded. The theory predicts the evolution of a set of opinions through the social network and establishes the existence of a martingale property, i.e. that the expected weighted fraction of the population that holds a given opinion is constant in time. Most importantly, this weighted fraction is not either zero or one, but corresponds to a non-trivial distribution of opinions in the long time limit. This co-existence of opinions within a social network is in agreement with the often observed locality effect, in which an opinion or a fad is localized to given groups without infecting the whole society. We verified these predictions, as well as those concerning the fragility of opinions and the importance of highly connected individuals in opinion formation, by performing computer experiments on a number of social networks

Strategies in social network formation

We run a computerised experiment of network formation where all connections are beneficial and only direct links are costly. Players simultaneously submit link proposals; a connection is made only when both players involved agree. We use both simulated and experimentally generated data to test the determinants of individual behaviour in network formation. We find that approximately 40% of the network formation strategies adopted by the experimental subjects can be accounted for as best responses. We test whether subjects follow alternative patterns of behaviour and in particular if they: propose links to those from whom they have received link proposals in the previous round; propose links to those who have the largest number of direct connections. We find that together with best response behaviour, these strategies explain approximately 75% of the observed choices. We estimate individual propensities to adopt each of these strategies, controlling for group effects. Finally we estimate a mixture model to highlight the proportion of each type of decision maker in the population

Elaboration of the Model of Formation of Readiness of Future Primary School Teachers to the Use of Learning-playing Technologies

The study characterizes the structural-functional model of formation of readiness of students of the specialty “Primary education” to using learning-playing technologies in the educational process. Among general modeling forms there was chosen the combined model (graphic descriptive scheme) of the structural-functional type. There was substantiated the main idea of modeling of the process of formation of future primary school teachers' readiness to using learning-playing technologies, especially, elaboration of such structural-functional model that would allow to improve the effectiveness of this process, to make it correspondent to social requirements and expectations from realization of New Ukrainian school principles. It was determined, that the object of modeling is the process of formation of readiness to using learning-playing technologies, realized within the general system of the professional training of future primary school teachers. The aim of the model creation was formulated: elaboration of the schematic construction that embodies the abstract structure and the real projected process and result. The theoretical-methodological approaches to the model projecting process were separated, namely: system, activity, personally oriented, competence. The main blocs of the elaborated structural-functional model were separated, especially, target, content, procedural and resulting

Strategies in Social Network Formation

We run a computerised experiment of network formation where all connections are beneficial and only direct links are costly. Players simultaneously submit link proposals; a connection is made only when both players involved agree. We use both simulated and experimentally generated data to test the determinants of individual behaviour in network formation. We find that approximately 40% of the network formation strategies adopted by the experimental subjects can be accounted for as best responses. We test whether subjects follow alternative patterns of behaviour and in particular if they: propose links to those from whom they have received link proposals in the previous round; propose links to those who have the largest number of direct connections. We find that together with best response behaviour, these strategies explain approximately 75% of the observed choices. We estimate individual propensities to adopt each of these strategies, controlling for group effects. Finally we estimate a mixture model to highlight the proportion of each type of decision maker in the population.network formation, experiments, mixture models

Social Network Formation with Consent

We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible.It is accepted that these consent models have a very large number of equilibria.However, until now no characterization of these equilibria has been established in the literature.We aim to fill this void and provide characterizations of stable networks or the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs.Furthermore, we provide a comparison of Nash equilibria with potential maximizers for a certain specification.game theory;general equilibrium

Network Formation and Social Coordination

This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pair-wise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network formation, however, has powerful effects on individual behavior: if costs of forming links are below a certain threshold then players coordinate on the risk-dominant action, while if costs are above this threshold then they coordinate on the efficient action. These findings are robust to a variety of modifications in the link formation process. For example, it may be posited that, in order for a link to materialize, the link proposal must be two-sided (i.e. put forward by both agents); or that, in case of a unilateral proposal, the link may be refused by the other party (if, say, the latter's net payoff is negative); or that a pair of agents can play the game even if connected only through indirect links.Networks, Links, Coordination games, Equilibrium selection, Risk dominance, Efficiency

The Study of Methodology of Formation of the Complex Mechanism of Strategic Management of Building Enterprise

Strategic objectives and principles that support them should automatically transform into a company concept, detail its status, express intent of the owner and management of the company, when working with customers and the public. Therefore, the implementation of strategic objectives and principles should be formed by the model of complex mechanism of strategic management. Mechanisms of strategic management can be represented as a set of factors; organizational, economic, motivational, technical and technological, legal and policy interventions that convert strategic management to the new, desired state. In practice, these mechanisms are so closely interrelated with each other that it is difficult to separate any natural factor, which is not included in the different mechanism of strategic management but rather belongs to factors of a different nature. Therefore, the selection of strategic management mechanisms on the principle of uniformity is made only by the presence of the main features: economic, organizational, motivational, technical, technological or legal. The fundamental difference between the proposed complex mechanism of strategic management of building enterprise management mechanism, is that the mechanism of strategic management has a modulated condition for achieving the future goals of the company and the future survival under fierce competition. Simulated version of our integrated strategic management mechanism of building company is able to achieve the strategic goals under different business operations. The actual mechanism of strategic management is always specific, and is always aimed at achieving specific goals through the implementation of specific strategies. It is formed whenever administrative decision has taken place by the coordination of all the elements of management mechanism. Some properties have long-term mechanism of action, other properties - a short-term. Strategic management deals with long-term goals, because it is essential in the formation of long-term mechanism of action. Thus, the formation mechanism of strategic management is carried out repeatedly in accordance to the objectives and strategies of the company to promote a certain goal. The result of these influences will bring the facility into compliance with management objectives. If you unable to mobilize the right amount of resources, you have to review or management techniques or readjust management objectives

Integration, social distress, and policy formation

I study the integration of regions in the form of a merger of populations, which I interpret as a revision of people's social space and their comparison set; I illustrate the way in which a merger can aggravate social distress; and I consider policy responses. Specifically, I view the merger of populations as a merger of income vectors; I measure social distress by aggregate relative deprivation; I demonstrate that a merger increases aggregate relative deprivation; and I show that a social planner is able to reverse this increase by means of least-cost, post-merger increases in individual incomes, but is unable to counter it by relying exclusively on a self-contained income redistribution that retains individual levels of wellbeing at their pre-merger levels. --integration of regions,merger of populations,revision of social space,aggregate relative deprivation,social distress,policy responses